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CHOOSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
TAM AND BRUNETTI 
ALFRED C. YEN* 
In Matal v. Tam1 and Iancu v. Brunetti,2 the Supreme Court did 
something it has never done before – namely apply strict First 
Amendment scrutiny to trademark law.  This is a big deal.  Many have 
argued, to relatively little effect, that intellectual property laws, like 
trademarks, raise serious free speech problems.3  It is therefore 
significant news for the Court to declare portions of the Lanham Act 
unconstitutional not once, but twice. 
Like all Supreme Court decisions that break new ground, Tam and 
Brunetti raise questions about what comes next.  In this Essay, I 
consider some of those possibilities and conclude that the 
consequences of Tam and Brunetti depend on whether future courts 
think the cases imply the rewriting of broad First Amendment 
doctrines or the opening of a new and subtle understanding about 
intellectual property and the First Amendment.  Both of these options 
 
 *   Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School.  The 
author would like to thank Celine DeSantis and Iris Ryou for their research assistance, and 
Chicago-Kent Law School for hosting a valuable symposium about the Supreme Court and 
intellectual property. 
Copyright 2020, by Alfred C. Yen. 
 1.  137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). 
 2.  139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019). 
 3.  Examples include Lisa Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 
61 S.M.U. L. Rev. 381 (2008) (advocating more robust application of First Amendment in 
trademark cases); Michael K. Cantwell, Confusion, Dilution, and Speech: First Amendment 
Limitations on the Trademark Estate, 87 Trademark L. Rep. 48 (1997) (arguing for greater First 
Amendment protection in trademark law); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: 
Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 Yale L. J. 1, 1 (2002) (characterizing copyright as “a kind of giant 
First Amendment duty-free zone” that flouts basic free speech principles); Joseph P. Bauer, 
Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy Allies, 67 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 831 (2010) (arguing that First Amendment interests have been denied in important 
copyright cases); Christina Bohannon, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 Hastings L. 
J. 1083 (2010) (arguing that existing copyright law conflicts with First Amendment principles by 
rejecting harm as a prerequisite to liability). 
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will require change to well-established features of existing First 
Amendment law. 
I conduct this inquiry in two parts.  First, I review some basic First 
Amendment doctrines, paying particular attention to the general 
application of strict scrutiny to the content-based regulation of speech.  
In so doing, I will draw particular attention to the Supreme Court’s 
unwillingness to distinguish viewpoint-based regulation from content-
based regulation for First Amendment purposes.  Second, I analyze 
Tam and Brunetti, paying particular attention to their immediate 
doctrinal consequences.  In particular, the cases raise the possibility 
that significant portions of the trademark and copyright law are 
unconstitutional.  I argue that courts are highly unlikely to accept these 
consequences, and that courts will try to limit the extent to which Tam 
and Brunetti invalidate existing intellectual property law.  Doing so 
will, however, almost certainly lead to significant change.  I conclude 
with a few thoughts about the direction I would like to see the courts 
take. 
I.     SOME FIRST AMENDMENT BASICS 
Although the First Amendment states that Congress shall make 
“no law” abridging freedom of speech,4 the Supreme Court has given 
laws affecting speech varying levels of constitutional scrutiny.  In some 
cases, the Court has applied strict scrutiny, making government 
regulation of speech presumptively unconstitutional.5  In others, the 
Court has imposed intermediate scrutiny, thereby exposing regulation 
of speech to significant, but not necessarily fatal, scrutiny.6  Finally, in 
still other cases, the Court has used the rational basis test to give 
government an essentially free hand to legislate as it sees fit.7  Three 
determinations play major roles in determining how courts review 
laws that affect speech interests. 
 
 4.  See U.S. Const. Amend. I (“Congress shall make no law. . .abridging the freedom of 
speech”). 
 5.  See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2218 (2015); Arkansas Writers Project v. 
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 221 (1987). 
 6.  See Central Hudson Gas and Electric v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624 (1995) (restriction against direct mail 
solicitation of potential personal injury clients does not violate First Amendment under Central 
Hudson intermediate scrutiny). 
 7.  See Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Academy, 551 U.S. 291, 
300 (2007) (State high school sports association rule prohibiting recruiting did not violate First 
Amendment because rule discouraged conduct). 
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First, courts ask whether the law in question regulates speech or 
conduct. Although the First Amendment’s application to only “speech” 
might make such a determination seem obvious, things get 
complicated because people often engage in nonverbal conduct for 
expressive purposes.  Parades, silent protests, the burning of flags, and 
other conduct often communicate very specific messages.  That having 
been said, the Supreme Court has not extended First Amendment 
protection to conduct simply because communication may be involved.  
If the First Amendment protected all communicative conduct, 
government would effectively lose its ability to govern.  For example, 
people burn draft cards to protest government policy, but protecting 
such conduct as speech would cripple operation of the draft.8  
Similarly, government regulation of labor markets might be impossible 
if the behavior of those involved in labor negotiations were treated as 
speech.9  Accordingly, the Supreme Court recognizes that conduct does 
not ordinarily receive First Amendment protection.10 
The second determination asks whether a law affecting speech is 
content-based or content-neutral. Content-based regulations affect 
speech by referring to its content.  These regulations include laws 
criminalizing the depiction of animal cruelty;11 establishing differential 
size restrictions for political, religious, directional and commercial 
street signs;12 and imposing higher taxes on magazines focused on 
particular subject areas.13  The Supreme Court has generally applied 
strict First Amendment scrutiny to content-based regulations because 
government can easily abuse them to censor speech.14  For example, a 
government that wanted to suppress communication about sports 
might well tax publications about sports at a higher rate.  By contrast, 
content-neutral laws affect speech without referring to its content.  
Examples of content-neutral laws include bans against the posting of 
 
 8.  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 367 (1968) (criminal prohibition against 
burning a draft card does not violate the First Amendment). 
 9.  See Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice. Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 (1949) (injunction against 
labor picketing did not violate First Amendment because holding otherwise would destroy a 
state’s power to govern labor law).  
 10.  See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011) (“It is true that restrictions on 
protected expression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity or, more generally, on 
nonexpressive conduct.”) 
 11.  U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 12.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 13.  Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987). 
 14.  See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 (“[A] law that is content based on its face is subject to strict 
scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of 
‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech”). 
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signs on public property15 and requiring performers in a park to use 
sound-amplification equipment and technicians provided by the city.16  
Laws like these may indeed affect speech, but they carry a relatively 
low risk of censorship because they do not single out particular 
content for suppression.  For this reason, the Supreme Court has 
generally applied only intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral laws.17 
For purposes of this Essay, it is helpful to note that content-based 
regulation of speech comes in two forms, ordinary content-based 
regulation and viewpoint-based regulation.  Ordinary content-based 
regulation exists whenever law uses the content of speech as the basis 
for differential treatment.  An ordinance prohibiting speeches about 
immigration law constitutes ordinary content-based regulation.  By 
contrast, viewpoint-based regulation is a subset of content-based 
regulation that uses the speaker’s point of view to determine whether 
regulation applies.  Thus, an ordinance prohibiting speeches that 
criticize the federal government’s immigration policy goes beyond 
looking at what the speaker talks about to examine the speaker’s 
perspective on the subject. 
When government deploys viewpoint-based regulation of speech, 
it necessarily promotes one set of ideas over others by identifying 
some viewpoints for favorable promotion over others.  This strikes 
directly at the heart of the First Amendment and easily explains why 
the Supreme Court would declare such regulation presumptively 
unconstitutional.  By contrast, ordinary content-based regulation 
threatens the First Amendment a bit less because favoring certain 
content over others does not necessarily imply favoring particular 
viewpoints.  A law prohibiting speeches about immigration does not 
favor speeches favorable to government policy over speeches hostile to 
it. 
This distinction between viewpoint-based and content-based 
regulation suggests that the First Amendment could treat these two 
forms of regulation differently.  For example, First Amendment 
 
 15.  See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (holding there to be a 
prohibition on the erection of outdoor advertising displays within the city does not violate First 
Amendment); Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 
789, 807 (1984) (upholding prohibition against posting of signs on public property and 
characterizing statute in Metromedia as “content-neutral”). 
 16.  See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 17.  Id. (applying intermediate level scrutiny to content-neutral regulation); Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (regulations unrelated to content of 
speech subject to intermediate scrutiny). 
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doctrine could declare viewpoint-based regulation presumptively 
unconstitutional while making it easier for content-based regulation to 
survive First Amendment review.  Importantly, the Supreme Court has 
generally rejected this possibility.  The Court has instead chosen to 
apply strict scrutiny to all forms of content-based regulation, whether 
ordinary or viewpoint-based. 
The reason for this is simple and powerful.  According to the 
Court, viewpoint-based discrimination may be a particularly odious 
form of content-based discrimination, but the censorship risks 
associated with ordinary content-based regulation are still too 
significant to accept.  For example, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,18 the 
court struck down a local ordinance that regulated the placement and 
size of street signs by their subject matter.  In so doing, the Court 
conceded that the city had not adopted the ordinance for censorial 
purposes.  Nevertheless, the Court wrote, “Innocent motives do not 
eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a facially content-
based statute, as future government officials may one day wield such 
statutes to suppress disfavored speech.”19  Similarly, in Arkansas 
Writers v. Ragland,20 the Court invalidated a law exempting certain 
types of magazines from sales tax.  The Court again recognized that the 
law did not constitute viewpoint-based discrimination, but it quoted 
with approval language from an earlier case: “[t]he First Amendment’s 
hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions 
on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of 
an entire topic.”21 
Finally, the third determination separates content-based 
regulation of speech from content-based regulation of commercial 
speech.  If the regulation applies to ordinary speech, then strict 
scrutiny follows.  However, if the regulation applies to commercial 
speech, only intermediate scrutiny applies.22  Courts separate these 
two forms of speech in order to preserve the effective regulation of 
commerce.  One might think of commerce as a form of conduct, but 
commerce inevitably involves speech because those selling goods and 
services must advertise, propose prices, and describe what they sell.  
 
 18.  Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231 (2015). 
 19.  Id. at 2229. 
 20.  Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 (1987). 
 21.  Id. at 230. 
 22.  See Central Hudson Gas and Electric v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624-25 (1995) (commercial speech reviewed 
under Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny). 
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Government may wish to prevent consumer deception by requiring 
disclosure of information sellers might prefer to keep hidden, but such 
regulation involves forcing an advertiser to speak against her will. 
Strict First Amendment scrutiny of such commercial regulation would 
render such a law presumptively unconstitutional, making effective 
commercial regulation extremely difficult.  The use of intermediate 
scrutiny instead gives government room to pass effective commercial 
regulation while also forcing government to have strong justification 
for its behavior.23 
II.    TAM AND BRUNETTI 
Before Tam and Brunetti, courts did not apply elevated forms of 
First Amendment scrutiny to trademark and copyright statutes.24  This 
outcome matches a judicial understanding that intellectual property 
statutes regulate commercial conduct, not speech.  Tam and Brunetti 
disrupt this understanding of the law. 
In Tam, the plaintiff Simon Tam sued over the government’s 
refusal to register the mark “Slants” for Tam’s rock band.  The 
government did so because “slants” is also a derogatory term for 
persons of Asian descent,25 and Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act denied 
registration to marks that “may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, 
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols or bring them into contempt, 
or disrepute.”26  Tam protested to no avail that he wanted to give the 
term a positive meaning by using it for his band, whose members were 
of Asian descent.27 
The Supreme Court ruled in Tam’s favor.  In doing so, the Court 
noted that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act violated a “bedrock” First 
Amendment principle against banning speech because it offends.28  
 
 23.  See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
651 (1985) (“[W]e hold than an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure 
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of 
consumer.”). 
 24.  See Lisa Ramsey, Free Speech Challenges to Trademark After Matal v. Tam, 56 Houston L. 
Rev. 401, 411-12 (2018) (courts avoided First Amendment scrutiny of trademark prior to Tam); 
Jed Rubenfeld, supra note 3 (noting that copyright is never reviewed seriously under the First 
Amendment). 
 25.  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). 
 26.  15 U.S.C. §1052(a).  
 27.  Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1751, 1754 (Tam “chose this moniker in order to ‘reclaim’ and ‘take 
ownership’ of stereotypes about people of Asian ethnicity”). 
 28.  Id. at 1751. 
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Section 2(a) therefore deprived Tam of registration’s benefits on the 
basis of viewpoint, making the provision unconstitutional. 
Tam is somewhat confusing because the justices produced three 
separate opinions about the proper level of scrutiny to apply, with 
none commanding a majority.29  Fortunately, the Court soon spoke 
again about the proper level of scrutiny in Brunetti.  In that case, the 
plaintiff attempted to register the mark “FUCT” for a line of clothing.  
The PTO refused registration, relying on portions of Section 2(a) that 
denied registration to scandalous or immoral marks.  The plaintiff 
sued, arguing that the First Amendment rendered these parts of 
Section 2(a) unconstitutional.  Not surprisingly, the Court again 
invalidated the provision under attack, citing Tam as support.  More 
importantly, six justices agreed that the viewpoint discrimination 
embodied in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act was presumptively 
unconstitutional and therefore deserving of strict scrutiny.30 
Tam and Brunetti’s application of strict scrutiny invokes the 
branch of First Amendment jurisprudence that generally prohibits 
government from enacting content-based regulations of speech.  This 
invocation has striking implications for trademark and copyright law 
because the relevant statutes are riddled with content-based 
discrimination. 
For example, the very granting of trademark protection depends 
on whether the claimant’s speech (i.e. the mark) is generic, descriptive, 
suggestive, fanciful, or arbitrary.31  Those who would otherwise own 
valid trademarks lose the right to use them if the marks “tarnish” other 
famous marks.32  Similarly, copyright protection depends on whether 
the work in question is “original.”33  The Copyright Act also grants 
different rights to various forms of expression.  For example, musical 
compositions get full protection from unauthorized public 
performance, while musical recordings get such protection only when 
the unauthorized performance is digital.34 
 
 29.  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 30.  Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019). 
 31.  See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(identifying categories of marks and their consequences for protection). 
 32.  See 15 U.S.C. §1125(c) (providing relief for dilution by tarnishment). 
 33.  See 17 U.S.C. 102(a) (extending protection to “original” works). 
 34.  See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §106(4) (2012) (extending general public 
performance rights to most types of copyrighted works); 17 U.S.C. §106(6) (extending public 
performance rights to sound recordings only when the work is performed by digital audio 
transmission). 
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If Brunetti and Tam stand for the proposition that strict scrutiny 
applies to content-based provisions of copyright and trademark law, 
dramatic change could follow.  Each of the provisions mentioned 
above, plus many others, would become presumptively 
unconstitutional.  Chaos would soon follow as basic provisions of 
intellectual property governing commerce would simply disappear.  
Claimants and users of creative works and trademarks would not 
know whether their works were still protected, or whether protection 
had simply evaporated. 
Personally, I do not believe that the Supreme Court intended for 
Tam and Brunetti to lead to such results, nor do I think that courts 
would allow this to happen.  However, avoiding this result will require 
disavowing either case law applying strict scrutiny to virtually all 
forms of content-based regulation or case law that rejects serious First 
Amendment review of intellectual property law. 
To see this, consider that the most obvious way to avoid chaos 
would be the limitation of Tam and Brunetti to their facts – namely 
cases of viewpoint-based discrimination in trademark law.  This 
strategy would allow the review of “ordinary” content-based 
regulation under more lenient intermediate or rational basis scrutiny, 
making it much easier to avoid mass invalidation of basic trademark 
and copyright law.  This strategy is of course entirely plausible, and 
perhaps even sensible.  However, using it would require turning away 
from well-established case law that refuses to distinguish between 
viewpoint-based and content-based regulation of speech. 
This refusal exists for good reason.  Viewpoint-based 
discrimination is the most obvious and objectionable form of content-
based discrimination.  Laws subsidizing speeches favorable to the 
mayor or those punishing speeches criticizing government policy 
constitute naked and obvious attempts to control the ideas people 
consider, but they are not the only laws that raise this risk.  
Government could also suppress free thought by regulating speech on 
the basis of its subject matter or mode of expression.  That is why 
oppressive regimes ban the publication of books about particular 
topics and outlaw music and dancing. 
The risks associated with content-based regulation have led the 
Supreme Court to declare it presumptively unconstitutional, even 
when the law in question was not passed for the purpose of favoring 
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some viewpoints over others.  For example, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,35 
the Court invalidated a local ordinance requiring permits for the 
posting of outdoor signs.  The ordinance also exempted 23 categories 
of signs from this requirement.  Of these signs, “ideological signs” 
received the most favorable treatment, with “political signs” receiving 
somewhat less favorable treatment, and other signs getting even less 
favorable treatment.36 
The Court struck down this ordinance by applying strict scrutiny.  
In so doing, the Court specifically rejected the notion that the town’s 
benign motives could obviate the need for strict scrutiny.  The Court 
wrote, “Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship 
presented by a facially content-based statute, as future government 
officials may one day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored 
speech.”37  This meant that “[A] law that is content based on its face is 
subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, 
content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas 
contained’ in the regulated speech.”38 
Cases like Reed39 problematize the strategy of limiting Tam and 
Brunetti to viewpoint-based regulation in intellectual property.  If the 
First Amendment treats viewpoint-based regulation differently from 
ordinary content-based regulation in trademark, one might well infer 
that same practice should follow elsewhere.  However, the Supreme 
Court has already explained why such a distinction would be wrong 
outside of intellectual property.  Thus, if the courts decide to limit Tam 
and Brunetti by distinguishing viewpoint-based from content-based 
regulation in trademark, they might also have to undertake the 
extremely controversial project of rewriting significant portions of 
existing First Amendment law. 
If courts prove unwilling to do this, a second possibility for 
limiting Tam and Brunetti emerges.  This would involve explaining 
exactly how intellectual property interacts with the First Amendment 
 
 35.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2218 (2015). 
 36.  Id. at 2224. 
 37.  Id. at 2229. 
 38.  Id. at 2228.   
 39.  Other cases taking the same position include City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 
Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (city prohibition against distribution of “commercial handbills” on public 
property is content-based regulation regardless of city’s motive); Simon & Shuster, Inc. v. 
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (no evidence of “improper 
censorial motive” needed to establish content-based regulation and strict scrutiny); Minneapolis 
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983) (“illicit legislative 
intent” not required for violation of the First Amendment). 
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for the purpose of determining when content-based regulation in 
intellectual property is constitutional.  This too is uncharted territory.  
As noted earlier, courts have consistently refused to apply anything 
more than the rational basis test to copyright and trademark law.  This 
does not mean, however, that thinking more deeply about the 
relationship of intellectual property to the First Amendment is doomed 
to failure.  For example, defamation cases were once generally free of 
First Amendment scrutiny until New York Times v. Sullivan.40  Since 
that case, however, the Supreme Court has developed a fairly elaborate 
set of constitutional rules within which libel law must operate.41  Doing 
likewise for trademark and copyright would surely be challenging, but 
it might also result in a constructive judicial response to the criticism 
that courts do not take the free speech implications of intellectual 
property seriously enough. 
III.     CONCLUSION 
In this Essay, I have sketched out two ways in which Tam and 
Brunetti could have major impact on intellectual property and First 
Amendment law.  One involves a concerted effort to distinguish 
viewpoint-based discrimination from ordinary content-based 
discrimination for the purpose of applying more lenient scrutiny to 
content-based discrimination.  The other contemplates new 
explanations about how intellectual property relates to the First 
Amendment.  Obviously, Tam and Brunetti do not tell courts which of 
these possibilities to pursue, or whether another option not discussed 
here makes even more sense.  However, I hope that courts decide to 
think more deeply about the relationship between intellectual 
property and the First Amendment.  Two reasons support this hope. 
First, I think that applying lower levels of scrutiny to ordinary 
content-based regulation would be a mistake.  If strict scrutiny no 
longer applies to those types of laws, governments will deploy content-
based regulation and then concoct reasons to justify laws of 
questionable constitutionality.  The Supreme Court has spoken clearly 
many times about how content-based laws raise unacceptable risks of 
censorship.  Making it easier for content-based laws to survive 
 
 40.  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 41.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (requiring differing levels of proof 
about recklessness and fault as a prerequisite to recovery in libel); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (allowing strict liability for libelous statements of 
purely private concern). 
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constitutional scrutiny raises the chances for oppressive government 
behavior with little chance of positive social return. 
Second, I agree that courts have not paid enough attention to 
tensions between intellectual property and the First Amendment.  
Accordingly, new opinions that do more than simply declare 
intellectual property laws constitutional would be most welcome.  I 
suspect that serious application of Tam and Brunetti to trademark and 
copyright will reveal many constitutionally suspect distinctions in the 
law of intellectual property.  Grappling with those distinctions, 
removing some of them, and improving the effect that intellectual 
property has on our society would be very constructive, and a fitting 
choice for the consequences of Tam and Brunetti. 
 
